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CONFLICTING RIGHTS AND THE
OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST
WORLD WAR
Leo Katz*
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Austria was no more wrong in opposing our claims than we were
in making them.
—Bismarck, on the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.1

Is it possible for good men to come to blows without anyone being to
blame? And was World War I a real-life realization of that possibility? Those
are the two questions this essay means to pursue.
My answer is “yes” to the first and “maybe” to the second of these
questions. Conflicts in which all parties are within their rights turn out to
be an everyday feature of our everyday morality.2 On at least one reading
of what happened, the outbreak of the First World War was such a conflict.
There is more tragedy in that than in a conflict between right and wrong.
Peace and Justice turn out to be strangely incompatible bedfellows.
I. SOME HISTORY
I am not the first criminal law scholar to take a crack at this issue. In late
August, 1923, the German Parliament approached one Hermann Kantorowicz, professor of criminal law at the University of Freiburg, with the
specific request that he write them a memorandum settling once and for all
who, if anyone, deserved to be held responsible for starting the Great War.
What many members of the committee hoped he would tell them was that
no one nation, least of all Germany, was responsible, that the war was akin
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks are due Ramzi Nasser for research
assistance, to my fellow symposiasts for their comments, and most especially to Claire Finkelstein for critiquing countless drafts.
1. ROBERT K. MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT 59 (Random House 1991).
2. By everyday morality I mean the kind of nonconsequentialist, deontological morality that
is reflected most unambiguously in our criminal law and in our everyday judgments concerning praise and blame.
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to a natural catastrophe, to be dealt with by regret, not recrimination, and
certainly not reparation.3
This was not quite the odd request then as it appears now. The Versailles
peace treaty had declared Germany to be the chief culprit, jointly, that is,
with Austria-Hungary, and had imposed enormous burdens largely on the
strength of this claim. As the treaty’s infamous Article 231 put it: “The Allied
and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility
of Germany and her Allies for all the loss to which the Allied and Associated
governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of
the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies.”
The Article instantly sparked a controversy whose embers even now have
some glow left in them. Over the course of the next few years, Germany
issued an unceasing stream of documents seeking to demonstrate the falsity
of the “war guilt” thesis. Other nations followed suit with documents of their
own, each anxious to exonerate itself of any part in the outbreak, with the
notable exception of the Soviet Union, which was happy to publish documents laying ample blame at the doorstep of the Czarist government.
Germany, however, retained the initiative in this war of words: The German
Foreign Office created a special branch devoted exclusively to “The War
Guilt Question,” to which it later added a Working Committee of German
Associations for Combating Lies concerning War Responsibility, and a Center for the Study of the Causes of the War. The government financed an
entire journal, simply called The War Guilt Question, whose sturdy monthly
issues were filled exclusively with the writings of prominent historians and
journalists, shedding their avowedly partisan light on the topic. It was a
Special War Guilt Subcommittee of the German Parliament which asked a
number of scholars to address themselves to different aspects of the war’s
outbreak, and which asked Kantorowicz for a comprehensive assessment of
the entire matter.
Kantorowicz wasn’t actually such an obscure person to whom to entrust
this issue. Aside from occupying the esteemed perch of a German professorship, he enjoyed considerable respect for his scholarly tomes on Albertus
Gandinus and Diplovatatius, two medieval criminal law commentators, and
had even achieved a measure of renown within the larger legal community
for his polemical tracts inaugurating the German version of legal realism.
Renown and respect had briefly turned to infamy when, in a book review,
he had dared cast aspersion on Bismarck, greatest icon of recent German
history. But so charming was Kantorowicz’s personality that the very students who had tried to disrupt his lectures in protest changed their minds
midway through and passed a resolution instead endorsing a professor’s
right to espouse whatever views he pleased. What had presumably attracted
the attention of the parliamentary subcommittee were some occasional
3. See preface by Imanuel Geiss to HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, GUTACHTEN ZUR KRIEGSSCHULD1914 (Imanuel Geiss ed., Frankfurt am Main: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt 1967).
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pieces of journalism he had done on the war guilt question, bringing to
bear a legal framework on the issue that the legislators must have found
particularly congenial. Equally important, however, was that he was known
as a German patriot who had insisted on enlisting in the war even though
he was already 37 years old at the time, and who could be expected to
deliver himself of an impressively impartial-sounding but nevertheless favorable verdict.
Kantorowicz did not think there was anything at all strange about the
Parliament turning to him for an answer to the war guilt question. He
thought the question a vitally important one and thought himself better
qualified to answer it than just about anyone else. In the preface to his
memorandum he explains why. Historians, he points out, have had a nearmonopoly on the issue but really have not been able to do more than tell
us what happened. Assigning responsibility requires an ability to think
normatively, he sententiously announces, which historians lack. Witness, he
says, this typically ineffectual argument mounted by Germany’s defenders:
“Germany and Austria may have made the war possible, but France and
Russia and Great Britain made it inevitable.”4 How, Kantorowicz sneeringly
asks, is that supposed to illuminate anything? “If the wife seeks to rid herself
of her husband, by pouring poison into his medicine, and handing the
latter to his nurse, then the wife has made the husband’s death ‘possible’
and the nurse has made it ‘inevitable.’ Yet the wife is guiltier than the
nurse!”5
Historians are not the only ones Kantorowicz dismisses with a sneer.
Philosophers do not fare much better, because, he observes, they are apt to
be pisspots, likely to be blinded by irrelevant ethical considerations. “Presumably we should acquit of guilt the politician who has done everything to
dissuade the enemy from going to war, even if he has done so for highly
reprehensible reasons, perhaps because he is a coward, or because he is in
the pay of a foreign power.”6 That is something a fastidious philosopher, he
says, is unlikely to grasp. In a similar vein, he thinks, a philosopher is apt to
falsely blame a country for starting a war if its justification, though a
perfectly good one, was a mere pretext. That makes no sense to Kantorowicz: If a man thinks he is being attacked and shoots his attacker in
self-defense, it does not matter that he had wanted to kill his victim all along
and was only waiting for a pretext.
Finally, Kantorowicz dismisses the international law expert. By the lights
of international law, it was, at least in 1914, no crime to start a war. What
that means is that when we are debating the war guilt question, we are
relying on an implicit code of values that simply had not been incorporated
into international law and to which the expert’s expertise has nothing to
contribute.
4. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 3, at 108.
5. Id., at 108.
6. Id., at 100.
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As Kantorowicz sees it, it is the criminal lawyer whose conceptual armamentarium uniquely equips him to settle the war guilt question. To drive
that point home, he prefaces his memorandum by transposing the events
leading to the outbreak of the war into the kind of common brawl which a
criminal law judge, or at least a law student taking an exam, might easily
find himself having to sort out. Neither that transposition, nor the rest of
this essay, however, is going to make much sense to you unless you have an
outline of the events of July 1914 at least loosely imprinted on your mind.
Before proceeding any further, therefore, let me “remind” you of those
events. Like most tragedies, they naturally divide themselves into five acts.7
Act 1. The Assassination
On a military inspection tour in Bosnia, the Austrian heir to the throne,
Francis Ferdinand, is assassinated by an Austrian subject of Serbian origin,
Gavrilo Princip. There are other Serbians behind the assassination. Serbia
has long been agitating against Austria and trying to lay claim to Bosnia and
various other parts of the seemingly moribund Habsburg Empire. Some of
the people behind Princip no doubt have some connections to the Serbian
government, but probably not enough and not high enough for this to be an
act “of ” the Serbian government. Needless to say, none of this is very clear in
the immediate aftermath of the assassination. All that Austria manages to
determine for now—quite erroneously, as it later turns out—is that some of
the plotters behind Princip belong to a secret Serbian society called Narodna
Odbrana, which is openly tolerated by the Serbian government. The Austrians overlook the more intimate involvement of another secret society, the
Black Hand, whose ties to the Serbian government are much closer.
Act 2. Austria and Serbia
Austria’s position now is somewhat like that in which the United States
would have found itself if Oswald had been found to be Cuban, and with
shadowy, hard-to-fathom connections to the Cuban secret service to boot.
What is Austria to do? Some kind of punitive action against Serbia—or
Cuba—seems to be required. But any such action is going to be frowned on
by Serbia’s—and Cuba’s—most powerful backer: Russia. Russia has always
wanted to be regarded as the “savior and leader” of Slav communities the
world over. Important balance-of-power considerations turn on being able
7. For two very readable, recent, and complete histories of the outbreak, see the final
chapters of MASSIE, supra note 1; and WILLIAM JANNEN, JR. THE LIONS OF JULY (Presidio 1996).
Their bibliographies are pretty good entries into the unfathomably rich literature about the
subject. For a good compact historiographical survey concerning the debate about the war
guilt question, see JOHN W. LANGDON, JULY 1914: THE LONG DEBATE, 1918–1990 (St. Martin’s
Press 1991). For a very recent revisitation of the debate, see NIALL FERGUSON, THE PITY OF WAR
(Basic Books, 1999).
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to maintain that posture. That makes it important to stand by Serbia now,
even though regicide is not something the Czar would naturally find himself supporting. Faced with the possibility of conflict with Russia, Austria
turns to its own most powerful backer, Germany. Wilhelm II promptly
assures them that Germany would support Austria in whatever conflict it
might find itself as a result of justified reaction to Serbia’s aggression.
With that assurance in hand—it comes to be known as the German blank
check—Austria sends an ultimatum to Serbia. The ultimatum asks that the
Serbian government make it a crime to disseminate propaganda calling for
the “liberation” of Austrian territories, that it immediately arrest one Major
Voislav Tankovich and one Major Milan Ciganovich, suspected architects of
the assassination, that it launch a judicial inquiry into the assassination
under the direct supervision of Austrian officials, and more. It is in the
words of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, “the most formidable document ever sent by one sovereign nation to another.”8 Austria does
not expect, or hope for, Serbia to submit. Austria plans to seize this welcome
opportunity to make war on Serbia and cut it down to a less dangerous size.
But as it turns out, Serbia accepts nearly all of Austria’s conditions—or
appears to anyway; there are some trapdoors in even the most unconditional acceptance—except the one putting Austrians in charge of the Serbian inquiry into the assassination. That is enough for Austria to judge the
ultimatum to have been rejected and to declare war on Serbia.
Act 3. Germany and Russia
As Austria rightly feared, Russia steps up as Serbia’s protector. Before the
ultimatum, it had simply urged restraint on Austria. After the ultimatum, it
decides more drastic action is needed. The Czar orders his army to mobilize. The mobilization is meant to give some reassurance to the Serbs, even
though no precise pledges are made as to what exactly Russia is prepared
to do in Serbia’s behalf or how far it will go in the event of an Austrian attack
on Serbia.
The Russian mobilization is bound to be extremely alarming to Germany.
For Russia is allied with France. If Russia goes to war with Austria, and
Germany rallies to Austria’s side, it will find itself at war with both Russia
and France. (In addition, Great Britain is loosely if not formally allied with
France and might well join in a war against Germany.) To deal with the
superior numbers of a French, Russian, and perhaps English army, Germany has adopted an audacious strategy known as the Schlieffen Plan,
named for Count Alfred von Schlieffen, the “monocled, wasp-waisted”9
German chief of staff who came up with it. The plan is designed to take
advantage of the fact that whereas both Germany and France can mobilize
8. MASSIE, supra, note 1, at 866.
9. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 17 (Macmillan 1962).
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quickly, Russia takes a much longer time to summon its citizens from its vast
terrain via an inadequate network of railroads. In the time it takes for Russia
to get its armies together, Germany means to concentrate most of its forces
on France, inflict a crushing defeat, and then redeploy all of its might
against Russia. Obviously, the plan depends crucially on not letting Russia
complete its mobilization before launching an attack against its French ally.
No sooner does the Kaiser learn of the Russian mobilization, than he asks
that it be terminated. But the Czar balks. The Kaiser returns with an
ultimatum: Demobilization or war! Great Britain tries to mediate and signals to Germany that if it should go to war with Russia, it is likely to have to
fight Great Britain as well. Hesitations ensue. There have been vaguely
similar standoffs in the past (though not between Germany and Russia).
Everyone thinks that one of these standoffs one of these days will lead to a
major European war. As it happens, Germany thinks that it is in a better
position to win such a war right now than it will be later. Russia thinks that
if a major war should grow out of this conflict, it would be handicapping
itself severely if it demobilized. And so Russia refuses to demobilize, and
Germany declares war. Austria has little choice but to follow suit.

Act 4. Germany and France
Since France is Russia’s official ally, Germany asks it to formally disavow its
alliance—and to back up that disavowal by allowing German troops to
temporarily occupy French fortresses at the French-German border. France
reaffirms its ties with Russia, and Germany declares war. The Schlieffen Plan
goes into effect: All forces are concentrated against France in hopes of a
quick defeat, to be followed by redeployment against Russia.

Act 5. Germany, Belgium, Great Britain
To inflict a quick defeat on France requires catching its army from behind,
where it does not expect it. “From behind” means not across the German
border, along which the French army is arrayed, but across the Belgian
border, whence no attack is feared. This is the essence of Germany’s Schlieffen Plan. But to reach the French-Belgian border, German troops first have
to cross the German-Belgian border! They have to invade Belgium, a neutral country, which offers no threat or offense to anyone. A treaty protects
Belgium’s independence, a treaty to which Germany, France, and Great
Britain are all signatories and which obliges each of them to come to
Belgium’s aid if it is ever attacked, most especially if it is attacked by a
signatory to the treaty. As German troops enter Belgium, Great Britain feels
duly obliged to act. It might have acted anyway, given its ties to France and
given its worries about a German-controlled Europe. The invasion of
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Belgium, however, makes things inevitable. And so Germany, and in due
course Austria, find themselves at war with Great Britain as well.
This, then, is the fact pattern which Kantorowicz is called on to evaluate
and which he believes his schooling in criminal law uniquely equips him to
evaluate. It is a complicated situation, he concedes, but how much more
complicated, he asks, than, say, the following criminal law case:
In the strife-prone Mexican village of Eu, an old peasant named A has been
living in long-smoldering enmity with his neighbor, the young S. The two of
them have regularly made each other’s life miserable, and have been constantly suspecting and accusing each other of all sorts of underhandedness.
To put an end to this intolerable state, A decides to take the most recent piece
of skullduggery by S as the perfect opportunity for beating S to pulp.
Fearing, however, that S’s cousin, one R, might get involved, A asks one of
R’s enemies, a certain G, for assistance. G does not think R’s involvement very
likely and certainly does not hope for it to occur; G greatly values his friendship with A, and thinks the chance to intimidate S, and maybe even settle
some old scores with R, is to be welcomed, and therefore assures A of all
necessary help. A now assaults S, despite his abject apologies and attempted
reassurances, heartily encouraged in all this by G.
S shouts for R’s help and R comes running, gun raised, aimed not only at
A, but also at G, whose intervention in behalf of A is certain. In addition, R’s
friend, GB, starts to get involved, first with pleas to G and A, which they
ignore, then with threats, which cause G to balk and hesitate, while A continues to beat up S.
Trusting in GB’s help, R’s friend, F also enters the scene. He does not feel
obligated to help R, but he fears losing his friendship if he does not, and
wants to possibly use this opportunity to rid himself of his old enemy G. But
before R and F can manage to get off a shot, G starts to fire, even though he
has really only been expecting an attack by R and F for a later hour, but thinks
this is the most opportune time to vanquish them both.
In order to better hit F, G has decided to enter the house of B, an
uninvolved back-door neighbor of F. B is a ward of both F and G. B tries to
resist the intruder and calls for help. This call for help brings on the scene a
third guardian of B, GB, who in turn fires at G, who has been a long-standing
annoyance to him. . . . 10

If the criminal law has the resources to assign responsibility in the above
case, says Kantorowicz, it should also have the resources to answer the War
Guilt Question.
II. PERMISSIBLE MUTUAL FRUSTRATION
My own motivation for investigating the War Guilt Question is of course
quite different from Kantorowicz’s. I am interested in the larger and largely
10. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 3, at 105-106. For the sake of readability, I have, in my
translation, replaced the names Kantorowicz gives to the parties with initials, changed the
paragraphing, and made some other analogous but equally inconsequential modifications.
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philosophical puzzle of whether it is possible for all parties to a conflict to
be justified, and whether the outbreak of the Great War exemplified, or at
least came close to exemplifying, such a situation. Indeed, for the moment
I would like to put the World War I aspect of the issue to the side and focus
exclusively on the conceptual possibility of all parties to a conflict being in
the right. Presumably we will first have to answer that question in the
affirmative before it is even worth considering the claim of the German
apologists that their conflict was such a one.
Many legal theorists, especially criminal law theorists, are likely to regard
what I am claiming to be an impossibility. Most recently, Heidi Hurd has
argued in her book Moral Combat,11 that it simply cannot happen that both
sides to a conflict will both be in the right, however temptingly largeminded it might seem to say so. If X has a right to do something, she insists,
then it necessarily follows that Y, correspondingly, does not have a right to
prevent X from doing it; and if Y does have a right to prevent X, well, then
that means correspondingly that X did not really have a right in the first
place to do whatever he was doing. And if there is a third-party bystander
in the vicinity, then that bystander is entitled to help whichever of the two
fighting parties is right and no one else. Hurd calls this the correspondence
thesis. Here is her more complete statement of it:
Consider the following hypothetical. Smith is attacked by a hoodlum while
walking her dog through the city park. Smith justifiably believes that her life
is in peril, and she is thus forced to choose between killing the hoodlum and
being killed or maimed herself. Jones is a jogger who witnesses the hoodlum’s
attack on Smith. Unable to affect the hoodlum’s conduct, Jones must choose
between permitting Smith to kill the hoodlum and intervening to prevent
that killing. Long is a concession stand owner who also witnesses the event.
Long is unable to affect the conduct of either the hoodlum or Smith, and so
can only choose between restraining Jones from intervening to prevent the
hoodlum’s death or allowing that intervention.
The morality of each actor’s choice appears to be determined by what I
shall call the “correspondence thesis.” The correspondence thesis asserts a
moral claim about correspondent actions. It holds that the justifiability of an
action determines the justifiability of permitting or preventing that action.
According to the correspondence thesis, if Smith is justified in killing the
hoodlum (as a means of self-defense), then Jones is not justified in intervening to prevent that killing, and hence, Long is justified in restraining Jones’s
intervention.12

The intuition behind the correspondence thesis is quite simply that morality cannot be gladiatorial: It cannot be that morality calls for interpersonal
combat.
11. HEIDI HURD, MORAL COMBAT (Cambridge University Press 1999). The book is replete
with insights, theses, and arguments bearing on the problem of “moral combat.” In this essay,
however, I shall be focusing on but one narrow sliver of the book.
12. Id. at 3.
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Hurd believes the correspondence thesis is true of all plausible moral
theories, whether they be consequentialist or deontological.13 My own interest in this essay is solely in deontological morality, since a good chunk of
law (especially criminal law) and of the everyday moral norms that guided
the World War I debate seems deontological in character. My challenge to
the correspondence thesis will therefore only concern its validity for deontological morality.
Hurd does not think the correspondence thesis is a logically necessary
feature of deontological morality. (It is a logically necessary feature of
consequentialist morality, she notes.) But although not logically necessary,
no plausible version of morality can really do without it, she believes:
A deontological, or agent-relative, theory of morality does not share the
characteristic that appears to make the correspondence thesis necessarily
true for the consequentialist. It is logically possible that a (certain type of)
deontological theory would render the correspondence thesis false. Suppose,
for example, that morality contained an agent-relative permission (or obligation) to kill when necessary to preserve one’s own life. Under such a moral
directive, it would be right for Smith to defend herself by killing her attacker.
But suppose that this morality also contained an agent-relative obligation (or
permission) to prevent killings by others, even when those killings are in
self-defense. Then it would be right for Jones to prevent Smith from (rightly)
defending herself. In such a theory, there is no correspondence between
what is right for Smith to do and what is right for Jones to do. . . . If morality
were to combine such maxims . . . [i]t would make us moral gladiators in an
arena in which one’s moral success would depend on another’s moral failure.
On pain of condemning us to moral combat, it thus would seem that any
plausible deontological moral theory would subscribe to the correspondence
thesis.14

Hurd readily acknowledges a number of exceptions and qualifications to
the correspondence thesis. There is, for instance, the case of the prisoner
who breaks out of a jail because he is about to be killed by fellow inmates.
What if a prison guard tries to shoot him? Should we not say that both the
prisoner and the guard are free of blame? The prisoner has good reason to
flee and the guard has a good reason to shoot, since he does not know why
the prisoner is fleeing. This example calls for only a mild amendment to the
correspondence thesis. It may perfectly easily happen that two actors in a
conflict are both free of blame because one or both of them are excused.
The correspondence thesis really only claims that the two parties to a
conflict cannot both be right in the sense of being justified. The correspondence thesis is not contradicted if one of the parties to a conflict is acting
13. When I say deontological, I mean to refer, broadly speaking, to any view that does not
seek to justify legal or moral rules in terms of their maximization of some external good.
Libertarianism, rights-theory, and retributivism are the names by which several greatly overlapping versions of such a view go.
14. HURD, supra note 11, at 9.
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wrongly but is nonetheless free of blame because of excusable ignorance,
or insanity, or duress, or something else of that ilk. In the case of the
escaping prisoner, the prisoner is acting rightly and the prison guard is
acting wrongly but is nonetheless free of blame: He is excused for what he
does because he does not know, and cannot be expected to know, that the
prisoner is fleeing for good and justifying reasons.15
Then there are the “innocent shield” cases:
. . . [T]he innocent person who is forced to shield a culpable criminal in a
shoot-out with an innocent police officer. In such a case, is it not right for the
police officer to defend herself by shooting through the innocent shield in
order to kill the criminal? And is it not simultaneously right for the innocent
shield to defend herself by shooting the officer (assuming that she can do
this, but cannot shoot the criminal who holds her hostage)?16

Does such a case not contradict the correspondence thesis? Hurd’s answer
to it is that it is not true that both parties to this conflict are right. To be
sure, both are free of blame, but only one of them (the police officer) is
justified, whereas the other (the victim) is merely excused. She deals similarly with variations of the famous lifeboat scenario, that is, two mothers
who “find themselves aboard a sinking ship that has only one life vest. If
each mother cannot secure that life vest for her own baby, her baby will
surely drown; is it not the case that each mother does the right thing in
attempting to obtain the life vest for her own child, even when this amounts
to preventing the other from saving her child?”17 No, it is not the case that
both mothers are doing the right thing. They are both excused, according
to Hurd, but not both justified.
A boxing match, or sporting contests more generally, might look like a
promising type of counterexample. This surely is a conflict in which all the
combating parties are not merely excused, but justified. Touché, says Hurd,
it is. We will have to make an exception for cases in which someone consents
to what would otherwise be wrongful. But that is a pretty small concession.
It leaves most of the correspondence thesis fully intact.18
When I first stated the correspondence thesis, I stated it in the language
of rights: “If X has a right to do something, then Y does not have a right to
hinder X’s doing so.” Hurd does not use the language of rights; the paraphrase is mine. Rights theorists are sure to wonder which, of the several
kinds of rights that rights theory has come to distinguish, I am talking
about. For instance, am I talking about what Bentham (filtered through
H. L. A. Hart) calls a “right correlative to an obligation” and what Hohfeld
(filtered through Judith Jarvis Thomson) calls a “claim-right,” that is, an
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id., at 278.
Id., at 278.
Id., at 284.
Id., at 273–277.
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obligation on the part of others to do or not do certain things?19 Or am I
talking about a “liberty-right,” that is, a freedom from an obligation to do
or not do certain things to others? The answer is that under the correspondence thesis the distinction does not much matter. The correspondence
thesis asserts that in any plausible deontological morality, to have a libertyright is to have a claim-right; to be entitled to do something (that is, to be
free from an obligation not to do it) is to be the beneficiary of a correlative
obligation by others not to mess with that entitlement.
If the correspondence thesis holds, conflicts between justified parties are
impossible. If Germany was right to attack France and Russia, then France
and Russia were wrong to defend themselves. And Great Britain was wrong
to assist them in defending themselves. But does the thesis hold?
Pinpricks for the Correspondence Thesis
I think the correspondence thesis is false as far as deontological morality is
concerned, or at least as far as our familiar, plausible version of deontological morality is concerned. I will begin my attack on the thesis with a series
of pinpricks, some fairly familiar doctrines in the law that seem inconsistent
with it. They are mere pinpricks because individually at least they will not
seem to call for more than some minute refinements and qualifications of
the thesis. Collectively, however, they may suggest that something more
serious is going on. In the next subsection, “Body-Blows for the Thesis,” I
will offer some more powerful counterexamples designed greatly to
strengthen your sense that a fundamental defect, not curable by the addition of some further minor exceptions, plagues the thesis. In my final
subsection, “The Nails in the Coffin,” I will try to lay bare the nature of that
defect.
My claim, contra Hurd, is that law and morality are full of situations in
which one party is entitled—in the sense of being justified, not merely
excused—to do something while another is entitled to do his utmost to
frustrate him. Perhaps the simplest example of what, from hereon out, I will
call permissible mutual frustration is the holding of a case with which many
law students begin their study of property law: Pierson v. Post.20 A hunter,
in hot pursuit of a fox, is brought up short when another hunter steps into
the fray at the last minute and captures and kills the beast. The first hunter
brings suit against the usurper. Has the usurper done anything wrong? Not
in the least, says the court, for under the rule of capture, a fugitive resource
belongs to the man who first captures it by reducing it to individual possession and control. Quaint though the facts of Pierson v. Post are, its principle
extends far beyond them—to water, and oil, and gas. The landowner whose
19. H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM (Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press 1982);
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (Harvard University Press 1990).
20. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. R. 175, 1805 WL 781, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1805).
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property happens to sit atop a pool of water or oil or gas, which he shares
with his neighbors, is treated exactly like the man whose property happens
to “sit beneath” a roaming herd of foxes. He owns what he can capture, no
more, no less. “The remedy of each against others alleged to be taking
amounts beyond their own shares was to ‘go and do likewise.’”21 But the
principle of the case extends further yet. It embodies the essence of intellectual property law, which treats the inventor and the writer pretty much
like the hunter or the miner, if we allow, that is, for the difficulty of
determining when an idea has been “captured.”
The defender of the correspondence thesis is likely to feel nonplussed.
“Why are these counterexamples?” she will ask. “They are cases of competition, not conflict. The thesis was never meant to apply to all instances of
mutual frustration. It certainly was not intended to cover cases of competition. Your examples really are pretty easily distinguishable from those the
thesis is about.”
But how easy is competition to distinguish from conflict? Consider the
law of hostile takeovers. The CEO of company A wants to acquire control
of company B. He proposes a merger to the board of company B, but the
board is not interested. He decides instead to make a tender offer to B’s
shareholders, offering to buy their shares at some very attractive price.
Once he has acquired all those shares, he plans to vote the current board
of directors out of office, replace the directors with his own nominees, and
arrange for the two companies to merge. B’s board of directors, however, is
likely to resist him in various highly frustrating ways. It might amend the
corporate charter so that a merger cannot be effectuated without the
consent of nearly all shareholders—which will, of course, deter the wouldbe acquirer from continuing to press his quest. Or it might amend the
charter so as to require anyone who acquired a controlling block of the
company’s shares to offer to buy all remaining shares at some astronomical
price. Or it might quickly sell some freshly minted shares to an especially
friendly party who is sure to oppose replacing the old board with a new one.
Or it might try to launch a counter–tender offer against the would-be
acquirer’s company and seek to oust him before he can carry out his plans.
Or it might engage in a strategic merger with a third company so as to create
an antitrust problem for the would-be acquirer. Or it might sell off its most
attractive divisions. Or it might simply engage in prolonged litigation to
hold up the transaction until the would-be acquirer’s financing arrangements fall through. The would-be acquirer, in turn, is going to resort to
countermeasures of his own, which I won’t bother to describe. The point of
the foregoing is simply to lead up to a rhetorical question: Is a takeover fight
like this a case of conflict or competition? Does not our inability easily to
answer that question suggest that the two categories are not truly distinct?
21. James E. Krier, Capture and Counteraction: Self-Help by Environmental Zealots, 30 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1039 (1996).
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Maybe the defender of the correspondence thesis has some other
way—other, that is, than distinguishing between conflict and competition—of taking these examples of permissible mutual frustration outside
the intended scope of the thesis, but it is not a trivial undertaking.
Let me turn to a different pinprick, an entirely different form of permissible mutual frustration that should trouble defenders of the thesis. Consider the law and morality of espionage. Although every state makes
espionage against itself a crime, every state also practices it toward other,
even friendly states. International law does not condemn it. Morality does
not appear to condemn it either. And even the domestic law that officially
condemns it steps very gingerly. A great deal of what is technically espionage, no one ever dreams of prosecuting: the spymasters, who do not
actually practice their trade in the country on which they are spying but
simply direct the network of agents who operate there, are usually exempt
from the spied-upon country’s efforts at prosecution, even when they happen to be easy to catch. The same holds for former spies who have risen to
become high-level politicians in the country for which they used to spy,
which is not true of other kinds of criminals who rise to high office. It also
holds for wartime spies who join the army of the country for which they
spied and later become prisoners-of-war. The Hague War Convention so
requires it. It grants no such immunity for other crimes.
I fear, however, that the defender of the correspondence thesis is going
to think of this example as just too sui generis to trouble her. Or perhaps
she will simply deny the moral permissibility of spying.
My final pinprick is the First Amendment. Political protest is the consummate example of permissible mutual frustration. Permissible protest can go
far beyond the mere expression of views. It includes a great deal of conduct:
dances, parades, flag-burnings, cross-burnings, outright libel, begging,
maybe even sleeping in the park. Strikes belong in the same category,
although technically it is not the First Amendment but analogous statutory
provisions that protect them.
I suspect a defender of the thesis might try to deal with this kind of
permissible mutual frustration by invoking the distinction between (what
Judith Jarvis Thomson calls) “distress-mediated harm” and physical harm.
More likely, however, she will respond to it with a certain measure of
impatience. All of these examples—hunting, mining, takeovers, espionage,
political protest—are really not very bothersome because they are so clearly
not what the correspondence thesis is intended to be about. It might
require a good deal of fastidious draftsmanship to get the thesis stated in
such a way as to be invulnerable to these counterexamples, but that’s all it
would require. The thesis was not meant to cover these cases; that is almost
surely transparent from the start; and that in turn should tell us that it is
just a matter of finagling to deal with them. That’s what makes these
counterexamples mere pinpricks.
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Body-Blows for the Thesis
My next and final set of counterexamples to the correspondence thesis
seem to me ones which the thesis is clearly meant to cover. Their existence
should therefore deal it an especially painful blow. What is more, several of
these examples, it will later turn out, rather closely resemble certain features of the World War I scenario.
(1) My first example is the case of a wife who knows that if her husband
should learn of a certain fact—an infidelity, say—he is going to kill her. Let
us imagine that the husband has entered his study and is about to start
playing his answering machine, on which is a message that, his wife knows,
will tell him about an affair she has been having. She knows that this will
send him into a homicidal rage. Right now he is still friendly and peaceable,
but she knows to a statistical certainty that within seconds things are going
to change. Her last chance to kill him is now, while he can still be caught
unawares. If you would like, you can imagine her to be a paraplegic and
confined to her bed, gun in hand, her only opportunity to kill him depending critically on the fact that he does not expect her attack. May she shoot
him while she still can?
People differ on this. Criminal codes differ on this. The common law
would have suggested that she could not. The common law conception of
the right of self-defense is built on its view of criminal attempts. Just as the
authorities are not entitled to arrest someone if he is still engaged in “mere
preparation,” even if they are statistically certain that his preparations are
going to eventuate in an actual attempt, so we are not entitled to use deadly
force in self-defense against someone merely because we are statistically
certain that he is eventually going to kill us. But many people think this is
absurd and would allow use of self-defense once enough evidence has
accumulated that an attack is going to occur.22
Let us assume that those who would permit the wife to use deadly force
are right. Now let us ask a further question: What happens when the wife
launches her justified attack against the as-yet-technically-innocent husband? He sees that he is being attacked and tries to defend himself. May he?
Given that he has not yet formed any wrongful designs against his wife, it is
hard to see how we can deny him his right to self-defense. This would then
seem to be a case in which both the attacker and the defender are justified
in their use of deadly force—a case of permissible mutual frustration.
Obviously Hurd can deny the various premises on which this example
depends. She might deny, for instance, that the husband is fully justified in
shooting back at his wife. She might say that he is merely excused. But is
that plausible? Is he merely excused as opposed to fully justified? Do we really
22. Martin E. Veinreideris, The Prospective Effects Of Modifying Existing Law to Accommodate
Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (2000); Sandra K. Lyons & David
McCord, Moral Reasoning and the Criminal Law: The Example of Self-Defense, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
97 (1992).
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think the husband is not fully within his rights in shooting back at someone
whom he finds shooting at him without any prior provocation? Hurd might
take a different tack. She might just agree with the common law that the
wife is unjustified because she was acting on the basis of a mere statistical
forecast. That is more promising, but for reasons I will discuss in the next
section (in which I discuss my general grounds for believing in the inevitability of conflicts between justified parties) implausible as well.
(2) My second counterexample involves a hiker who finds himself
stranded in the mountains. He has no more food or water. He breaks into
a cabin to scavenge for what he can find. According to the criminal law,
and according to everyday morality, he is not guilty of a crime. He has a
defense of necessity. Theft to avert starvation under these circumstances is
alright.
Now suppose that the owner of the cabin barges in on him. And suppose
that rather than just taking the food, the hiker asks for the owner’s permission. Is the owner allowed to refuse? It seems hard to say that he is not. After
all, no one is obligated to be a Good Samaritan. What if the hiker then
simply tries to help himself to the property over the owner’s objection? Can
the owner resist? It is not easy to argue that he cannot. After all, if he is
entitled to refuse, why not also to resist? But if the owner is entitled to resist
while the hiker is entitled to do what he can to get hold of the stuff, then
we have a conflict in which both sides appear to be justified.
I suppose Hurd might deal with this case by denying that the owner is
entitled to prevent the hiker from helping himself to some food. She might
even cite the law in support of that: There are some well-known tort cases
that would seem to suggest that owners under these circumstances must
yield to the victims of necessity.23 But what will she do with the prescient
owner who tries to frustrate the hiker not by refusing his request outright
but by hiding or in some other way making his food inaccessible to him?
Now, it really seems hard to deny that both the owner trying to frustrate the
hiker and the hiker trying to overcome the efforts of the owner are acting
within their rights.
(3) My third counterexample: It is often moral to threaten what you are
not in fact entitled to do. If someone is about to steal my wallet, I cannot
shoot him to prevent his theft, but it would seem I can threaten to shoot
him. But what now if the person who is thus threatened proceeds to do the
thing which my threat was designed to deter, and rightly fears that he is
about to be killed by unjustified force? Suppose he decides to use deadly
force of his own in defense against me? It seems hard to deny him this right.
Here the threat and the preemptive force used in response to it seem yet
again instances of permissible mutual frustration.
(4) Consider finally this last, quite elaborate case. It is much longer than
23. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A.188, 20 L.R.A.N.S. 152, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1072, 15 Am.
Ann. Cas. 1151 (Vt., Oct. 2, 1908). Vincent v. Lake Eerie, 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W.221, 27
L.R.A.N.S. 312 (Minn., Jan. 14, 1910).
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the previous ones; on the other hand, it may well be my most potent, least
controversial counterexample to the correspondence thesis.
A friend of mine has been charged with murder. The evidence against
him is overwhelming. A death sentence looms. I know this friend of mine
extremely well, and I am convinced he could not possibly be guilty. I believe
this not because I have any tangible evidence but simply because I know him
so very well. What is more, let us agree that any reasonable person who knew
him as I know him would draw exactly the same conclusion. So notwithstanding the fact that I have no tangible evidence to prove his innocence, I
really am perfectly sensible, perfectly rational in thinking him innocent. I
am determined to get him off, but see no good way of doing so. If I simply
testified as a character witness, that is not going to help much. I am known
to be his friend and will be distrusted on that account alone, and all I have
to offer by way of evidence is the sort of thing philosophers have come to
call “tacit” knowledge, inherently incommunicable, unverifiable facts about
the kind of person he is. Realizing all of this, I decide that the only way to
save him is to perjure myself: I invent an alibi for him. So convincing is this
fabricated alibi that I actually manage to get him acquitted. When the trial
is over, more evidence about the murder surfaces. This evidence now makes
two things unequivocally clear—first, that my friend really is innocent, and
second, that I made up the alibi. In due course, I am charged with perjury.
Should I be convicted?
I presented this case some years ago to a group of federal trial court
judges. Concretely, what I asked them was whether I should be able to
invoke the defense of necessity. I had committed what would ordinarily
amount to the crime of perjury but I had done so to save an innocent man’s
life. Moreover, I had been both reasonable and correct in my surmise that
he was innocent. Is that not exactly what the necessity defense is about—acquitting someone of criminal misconduct when “the harm or evil sought to
be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged”?24
To my astonishment, the judges did not agree with me. They all felt that I
should be convicted of perjury. They were willing to concede that I had acted
decently when I perjured myself. Many went so far as to say they hoped they
would have the courage to do what I had hypothetically done. They were
willing to agree that a good prosecutor should exercise his discretion in my
behalf and not press charges. But once charges were pressed, they very
much felt I should be convicted. What is it that made them feel that way?
One judge compared perjury to “peeing in the pool.” An apt comparison,
but one that only heightens the dilemma. What is wrong with peeing in the
pool when a man’s life is at stake? What these judges were in fact correctly
sensing and not so inaptly expressing with that pool metaphor is that something quite ominous would happen if they did agree to acquit me of perjury.
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(a).
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Consider more closely the underlying logic of my position. I am saying
that whenever I reasonably think that by lying to the court I am likely to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, I am entitled to do so. Nothing about the
logic of my position would limit it to murder. It would be a general license
to lie whenever a witness reasonably thinks that the cause of justice is served
thereby. The judges somehow felt that in giving out such a license, the cause
of justice would in fact not be served. Were they correct in this surmise? I
think they were, but it is a subtle point and requires some elaboration. It is
by no means obvious.
What exactly would happen if we allowed everyone to lie if necessity
so counseled? In a world in which “reasonable perjury” is legal, no judge,
or jury, would ever know whether the testimony is offered because it is
correct or because the witness (reasonably) believes that it would serve
to bring about the right verdict. This is tantamount to asking every witness
simply to testify about what he (reasonably) thinks the ultimate outcome
of the trial should be. Indeed it would be tantamount to not letting him
testify to anything else even if he wants to. (For even if he wants to, he
is unable to. That is because we can never determine whether he is testifying as he is because he is being strategic. We could ask him, of course.
But his answer would be meaningless. He could still be lying, and be
able to defend his lie on the grounds of necessity.) If we did this, we
would be throwing away a lot of evidence. The result would be tons of
incorrect verdicts, incorrect acquittals, and incorrect convictions. Overall,
there would thus be a lot less justice if “reasonable perjury” were allowed.
This, I believe, the judges were correctly sensing and expressing by their
unwillingness to let me off.25
That does not mean, however, that the judges were right. They wanted to
see me convicted because they felt that overall justice would be maximized
if they did so. In that assessment they were correct. But that does not change
the fact that they would be convicting me for conduct which they conceded
was perfectly moral: telling a lie in court to save an innocent man’s life.
They simply felt that committing one injustice here and now—that of
convicting me for my perfectly moral conduct—was justified because it
prevented many more injustices down the road. I asked them how they
would feel about the classic dilemma of the judge who is asked to order the
execution of an innocent because a lynch mob outside the courthouse is
threatening to erupt and to produce the deaths of many more innocents by
its rioting. Here they had no reluctance, saying that the judge is not
permitted to act even if in so doing he saves several more innocent lives.
How then is this case different from that?
The perjury dilemma may seem highly specialized, but it is not. In fact,
it is remarkably commonplace. Laws against euthanasia, marijuana, or nee25. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV.
1001 (1991).
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dle exchanges raise the identical dilemma in very obvious ways. Many
people would agree that in a variety of situations voluntary euthanasia is
perfectly moral. They fear, however, that once we allow it, we will be sliding
down a slippery slope in which the euthanasia exception will be abused,
and patients who do not want to die, but are a burden on some others who
could benefit from their deaths, will be cold-bloodedly killed off, their
deaths disguised as voluntary euthanasia. In other words, many opponents
of voluntary euthanasia concede that there are many cases of justifiable
voluntary euthanasia (like the morally irreproachable husband who helps
his pain-wracked wife escape the final stages of a terminal illness), and that
a flat prohibition will have regrettable consequences in those cases. Nevertheless, they believe that those regrettable consequences are outweighed
by desirable ones, the prevention of murders-disguised-as-euthanasia. The
problem is that a judge who is asked to apply such a flat prohibition to a
case of morally justifiable euthanasia is not much different from the judge
who orders the execution of the innocent prisoners so as to appease the
lynch mob. The argument parallels exactly the one about perjury and it
can readily be extended to the prohibition of marijuana and needle exchanges.
Notice now a crucial feature of these examples for our purposes: Consider the
lawmaker thinking about adopting a law prohibiting perjury, or euthanasia,
or marijuana use, or needle exchanges. Even though it is morally right
(deontologically speaking) for the lawmaker to adopt such a law and to try
to make sure that it will be applied without fail, once the law has been
passed, it will then also be morally right for the citizenry to try to undermine the law and prevent it from being applied where necessity so counsels.
Even though it might be morally right to adopt a prohibition against
perjury, euthanasia, marijuana, and needle exchanges, and to put in place
a regime that will impose the prohibition regardless of specific sympathyevoking circumstances, it will also be morally right, once the law is in place,
to try to prevent it from being applied to the person who perjures himself
to save an innocent from conviction, or who helps his ailing wife to die, or
who uses marijuana for medicinal purposes, or who distributes needles to
drug addicts who will get infected otherwise.26
To see that this is not as perverse as it sounds, think of the analogous
problem posed by Gregory Kavka in connection with nuclear deterrence.
26. In MORAL COMBAT, Hurd actually discusses examples that are analytically equivalent to
this one and acknowledges that they might be regarded as counterexamples to the correspondence thesis. But not very troubling counterexamples, argues the book. At most, it says, they
constitute the kind of exception that proves the rule. The book points out that examples like
these crucially depend on the fact that people make errors: The perjury example depends on
the fact that judges and juries are apt occasionally to convict the innocent and acquit the guilty,
and that this can be minimized by avoiding all perjury, however well justified. The euthanasia
example depends on the fact that judges and juries are apt to mistake murder for voluntary
euthanasia, and that this can be minimized by avoiding all euthanasia, however genuine and
well justified. Hurd insists that such cases are unimportant exceptions to the correspondence
thesis because they are of “pragmatic interest only.” “If one’s concern is with the content of
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As Kavka plausibly argued, it is quite moral to adopt a system whereby
disproportionate retaliation will be threatened against another country that
might launch a nuclear attack against us. However, it is also the case that it
would be immoral actually to launch such disproportionate force once we
have been attacked. What this means is that it is moral to set up a system of
disproportionate force and moral to undermine it once it is about to be
used. The creator of a nuclear deterrence regime and its eventual user thus
stand in a relationship of permissible mutual frustration, exactly like the
creator of a prohibition on perjury, euthanasia, marijuana, and needle
exchanges and the citizen who engages in perjury, euthanasia, marijuana
use, or needle exchanges under justifiable circumstances.27
The Nails in the Coffin
Having proceeded incrementally so far, I want to turn next to the larger
claim which all of these examples were meant to soften you up to accept.
The larger claim is that permissible mutual frustration is an essential and
widespread feature of any deontological morality—so essential and so widespread as to leave the correspondence thesis eviscerated beyond repair.
The claim is an implication of something which will at first glance not
seem to have anything to do with the problem at hand. Elsewhere I have
developed what I think of as a theory of loopholes, that is, a theory that
seeks to explain why laws have loopholes. It does not seek to explain all
loopholes, just a significant number of them.28 What I mean by a loophole
in a law is a strategy whereby someone can ostensibly comply with the terms
of a law while undercutting its purpose and doing what the law was intended
to prevent. Now, there are different approaches that people have taken to
try to account for why legislatures and judges do not just plug loopholes.
One approach is to focus on the practical factors that make it impossible to
produce rules that are completely strategy-proof.29 I have no doubt that
there are indeed factors that make the design of rules that are completely
strategy-proof inherently impossible. But my own concern has been with
loopholes that need to be explained in a different fashion. My conviction
that there are a lot of loopholes that require a different account stems from
morality, and not with the strategic methods necessary for its realization, one will find the
[claim about conflicting rights] to be beside the point—at least if that [claim] is premised
solely on the fact that actors make errors” at 201. In other words, the book argues that this too
is a scenario which the correspondence thesis was really never meant to cover. That observation would have more force if there were not already so many other exceptions to the
correspondence thesis, and if there were not the more general reasons for doubting it, which
I set forth in “The Nails to the Coffin” section.
27. GREGORY KAVKA, MORAL PARADOXES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 15–56 (Cambridge University Press 1987).
28. See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE
LAW (University of Chicago Press 1996).
29. Stephen Bundy and Einer Elauge have developed such an account in Knowledge about
Legal Solutions, in 92 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 261 (1993).

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 17 Sep 2013

IP address: 130.91.146.35

360

LEO KATZ

the fact that loophole exploitation is not exclusively a feature of the law.
There is a lot of it going on outside of the law. Here is an example that
might sound familiar to some. Take the Jewish prohibition against running
a business on the Sabbath. Jews used to circumvent this prohibition routinely by selling their businesses to a Gentile the day before the Sabbath,
having the Gentile keep them open during the Sabbath, and repurchasing
the business on the day after.30 I take it that whatever is going on here, it is
not God’s inability to come up with a strategy-proof rule that allows this kind
of loophole exploitation. Or take the way in which many of us feel comfortable circumventing the ban against lying. We stay silent or we say something
misleading but literally true. Again, whatever is going on here, whatever it
is that allows us to get around the ban against lying by this kind of indirection, it does not seem to be the fact that someone failed to draft the ban
against lying in a strategy-proof manner.
If there is something like loophole exploitation going on outside the law,
in the world of everyday morality, that suggests that our everyday morality
has loopholes too, just like the law. And since we know that a good deal of
law, especially criminal law, mirrors everyday morality, it seems likely that
whatever accounts for the loopholes of everyday morality should account
for at least some of the law’s loopholes as well. But what explains the
loopholes of everyday morality, and what exactly does it mean to say that
morality has loopholes?
For an explanation, it helps to focus on a feature of everyday morality and
of criminal law that is both obvious and overlooked, striking and unappreciated. I call it path-dependence, a term I borrow from economics, but its
meaning in this context may not be self-evident. Here is a hypothetical to
show what I have in mind. Imagine a man standing in line for a movie ticket.
A little way away, an assassin takes aim at him. The intended victim is a
friend of mine and I would very much like to save him. So what I do is to
seize another bystander, indeed the person standing right next to him in
the movie queue, to quickly drag him into the path of the bullet. Thus using
the bystander as a shield, I save my friend’s life. What I have done pretty
clearly would be murder. To be sure, I might try to plead the defense of
necessity, or duress, but they almost surely would not apply. I will not dwell
on why that is. Now suppose that I had tried to save my friend’s life in a
slightly different way. Suppose I had managed somehow just to shove my
friend out of the way, with the result that the assassin’s bullet hits the person
standing next to him instead, that selfsame bystander whom I originally
contemplated dragging into the path of the bullet and using as a shield. If
I did that, I would be perfectly within my rights—no homicide; no crime
whatsoever. Nevertheless, I would in a sense have done the very same thing
as before. I would have sacrificed the life of a bystander so as to save my
30. JACOB KATZ, THE SHABBES-GOY (Yoel Lerner trans., Philadelphia: Jewish Publications
Society, 1989).
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friend, but I would have done so through a shoving maneuver rather than
a shielding maneuver, and that makes all the difference in the world,
morally and legally speaking. That is what I mean by path-dependence. The
very same result achieved by an ever-so-slightly different path is evaluated
radically differently by the lights of everyday morality and of criminal law.31
My earlier examples about keeping the Sabbath and about lying are also
examples of path-dependence. Running a business on the Sabbath violates
Jewish religion; running it by first selling it to a Gentile and then buying it
back does not. Communicating a falsehood by a lie is immoral; doing it by
silence or misleading but literally true statements arguably is not.
Everyday morality and criminal law are full of these kinds of contrasts
between highly similar forms of conduct that are evaluated differently
because of relatively minor nuances differentiating the paths which the
actor took to his desired result. These path-dependencies turn into loopholes when you think of people as strategically exploiting them, that is,
when you think of someone wanting to attain a goal that looks at first glance
to be off limits, and then figuring out a path to that seemingly unattainable
goal. My account of loopholes asserts that when we encounter what appear
to be loopholes in law, a close investigation of the matter will frequently
reveal that the law in question mirrors some underlying moral rule which
happens to have an unappreciated path-dependence built into it, which
clever lawyers are exploiting.
How is this theory of loopholes and path-dependencies related to my
claim that everyday morality and criminal law is full of conflicts between
justified parties? The fact that law and morality are full of these pathdependencies turns out to imply that there are likely to be lots of conflicts
between justified actors. How does it imply that? Let us take another look
at my stranded hiker hypothetical, because that will serve to bring out the
connection.
Suppose an advocate of the correspondence thesis looks at this hiker
example and says: “Well, I can see how it might seem as though both sides
to this conflict are justified. What that tells me is that there is a problem with
our rules. We should take the justification away from one of the parties, so
that it doesn’t happen that we have two parties to a conflict both being
justified. In fact, I think that’s what needs to be done with all of your
examples of this kind of thing: strip one of the parties of their justification.
Now, I guess I wouldn’t want to strip the hiker of his justification because
letting him help himself to someone’s property when he is about to die
seems morally totally unobjectionable. I would say let’s deny the owner the
right to stop the hiker from helping himself to food, and if he insists on
taking the food away from the starving hiker, well, then he is guilty of
homicide. Indeed, isn’t this what the tort law already does with cases that
greatly resemble your hiker hypothetical. Like the well-known torts case
31. Christopher Boorse and Roy Sorensen, Ducking Harm, 85 J. PHIL. 115 (1988).
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Ploof v. Putnam,32 about a dock owner who disconnects, and thereby damages, a sloop that has put in at his dock during a storm without his consent.
The dock owner was held liable to the sloop owner.” The problem with this
proposal is that it does not eliminate the conflict. Suppose the cabin owner,
having been told that he cannot take his food back from the hiker, tries to
protect his property in some other way, say, by getting a spring gun. The
advocate of the correspondence thesis might of course insist that he should
not be allowed to that either. In fact courts have frequently declared spring
guns illegal. So what about a vicious guard dog? I suppose that if a court is
prepared to strike down spring guns, it might also strike down vicious guard
dogs. Well, then, what if the cabin owner puts the food into a cage where
he keeps his poisonous pet snake? Would a court strike that down too? If
so, what about putting it on a very high armoire, which the hiker is likely to
fall off of and die if he tries to climb it? Or what about just hiding it? Or, for
that matter, what about just not leaving any surplus food in the cabin at all?
As long as any of these strategies for starving the hiker remain available, the
conflict between the hiker and the cabin owner has not been laid to rest.
But what exactly prevents us from just prohibiting all of these strategies?
Think of what it would mean to eliminate them. It would mean declaring it
to be homicide not only if the owner takes food out of the hiker’s hand, but
also if he puts it in the cage with his pet snake, or if he puts it on a very high
armoire, or if he hides it, or if he does not leave any of it in the cabin. Each
of these are ways of causing death, but they are ways of causing death that
we evaluate radically differently from causing death by taking the food out
of the hiker’s hands. We have here path-dependence at work. We evaluate
these different ways of causing death quite differently. The only way to
eliminate the conflict is to eliminate the path-dependence. But these pathdependencies appear to be an ineradicable part of our morality. It would
strike us as unacceptable to live without them. This, then, is what I mean
when I say that path-dependence makes conflicts between justified parties
inevitable.
Let me state my point in a slightly different way as well, which is probably
less illuminating than the example I just went through. Criminal law and
morality by and large serve to eliminate conflict: They prevent us from
committing the murders and assaults and thefts and other incursions on
each other’s welfare that constitute the conflict-ridden state of nature. We
think that by adopting criminal laws and by subscribing to morality we have
gotten rid of conflict. But the fact that there are these path-dependencies
and loopholes right in the middle of our criminal law and our morality
means that there are still selected islands of opportunity for conflict to
occur, conflicts in which the parties are acting completely consistently with
what criminal law and morality require, but conflicts nonetheless. That is
32. 81 Vt. 471, 71A. 188, 20 L.R.A.N.S. 152, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1072, 15 Am. Ann. Cas. 1151
(Vt., Oct. 02, 1908).
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because the presence of loopholes means that you can still commit the
functional equivalent of a killing or a wounding or a stealing without being
guilty of a killing or a wounding or a stealing. But if two parties are free to
perpetrate against each other the functional equivalents of some crimes
without actually being guilty of those crimes, then we have a conflict between two parties both of whom are justified. In other words, as long as the
criminal law and everyday morality exhibit these ineliminable path-dependencies, they are also going to exhibit conflicts between justified parties.

III. THE WAR GUILT QUESTION
Does any of this apply to World War I?
Hermann Kantorowicz, to the chagrin of the German Parliament, decided that the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, did in fact bear the
brunt of the blame for the Great War. My own assessment is rather different.
But let me first offer a brief delineation of Kantorowicz’s conclusions.
Kantorowicz begins by suggesting that we carefully distinguish two kinds of
“crimes” that the war’s participants could be charged with starting: Endangerment of the Peace is the first; Breaking of the Peace is the second. The
War Guilt Question really concerns the latter, but issues pertaining to the
former are often confusingly injected into the debate. As he sees it, historians debating the War Guilt Question have spilled unnecessary ink over
Germany’s massive ship-building program, or over the belligerent pronouncements of some French politicians concerning the reconquest of
Alsace-Lorraine, or over the ways in which various Russian politicians
wanted to redesign Europe in the aftermath of a major war. All of those
actions at most served to endanger the peace; none of them led to its actual
outbreak in the event, at least not as proximately or directly as law and
morality demand.
Turning to the crime at issue, the Breaking of the Peace in 1914, Kantorowicz puts most of the blame for the war on Austria. He doubts the
Serbian government was behind the assassination of Francis Ferdinand: It
would not have been in Serbia’s interest, he notes, to give Austria such a
convenient pretext for attack. Austria, in turn, had some advance warning,
took woefully few precautions to protect Francis Ferdinand, and most
important, stood to benefit in numerous ways from such an undertaking:
Francis Ferdinand was thought to be syphilitic and his death was viewed by
many government officials as a godsend. And then, of course, Austria had
long been spoiling for just such an opportunity. Serbia thus not having
given Austria cause for any action, Kantorowicz therefore views Austria’s
actions as being an outrageous attempt to redraw the map of Europe. To be
sure, he mitigates its responsibility in the following way: Austria intentionally caused the war in the Balkans, he notes, but only recklessly caused the
World War. (Actually he is more subtle than that: he carefully distinguishes
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between the European war and the World War, thinks that Austria was guilty
of an aggravated form of recklessness known as dolus eventualis vis-à-vis the
European war but simple recklessness vis-à-vis the World War.) Germany in
turn is blamed for encouraging Austria’s misconduct, in other words, as an
accomplice in the crime of Breaking the Peace. Kantorowicz adds extra
blame to the Austrian and German ledger for refusing to take seriously
Great Britain’s last-ditch attempts to save the peace through negotiations.
Kantorowicz briefly investigates the possibility of justifications. Austria has
at times argued that it was fighting to preserve the peace, in that a war
against Serbia was meant to avert a greater conflict down the road. Kantorowicz finds no sense in that proposition, indeed does not believe that the
preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire required a war on Serbia.
Germany in turn has at times argued that France and Russia were likely to
launch an attack when they had grown strong enough, which was likely to
happen in about three years. Again, Kantorowicz is doubtful, but most of all
does not think that a preemptive strike this far in advance can be counted
as legitimate self-defense. Interestingly Kantorowicz does not blame Germany for anything it did after the Russian mobilization had occurred. It
acted correctly in activating the Schlieffen Plan, in putting Russia to the
choice of quickly demobilizing or going to war, in striking out at France
once it had failed to dissociate itself from Russia, and in crossing into
Belgian territory in order to defeat France. He finds fault only in the actions
that led to that state of affairs.
So much for his assessment of the Central Powers. His assessment of the
Entente Powers is kinder but hardly free of reproach. He blames neither for
starting the war but both for attempting to start the war. The bulk of his
criticism is directed at Russia for mobilizing. Russia had nothing at stake, as
he sees it, that would have justified going to war: Its only concerns were
distant balance-of-power considerations, its reputation among neighboring
Slavic countries. No treaty obligations bound it to Serbia. On the other
hand, he says, it is a measure of the slightness of Russia’s guilt that if a treaty
had existed between it and Serbia—which easily might have been the
case—it would have been beyond reproach in mobilizing. France’s guilt for
its attempted Breaking of the Peace is less than Russia’s because it acted
under duress or necessity: Had it not stood by Russia in its moment of need,
Russia would have in the long run abandoned the French-Russian alliance,
and France would have been vulnerable to a successful German attack.
Kantorowicz denies France the full weight of a duress or necessity defense
because he blames a century of French policy for cultivating the German
enmity that now put them in such a predicament.
Kantorowicz thus ends up assigning a lot of blame all around to both
sides of the conflict, with the lion’s share falling on the Central Powers.
Some of the reasons he comes out as he does have to do with the peculiar
way he applies some familiar criminal law doctrines. For instance, he counts
it heavily against Germany and Austria that they spurned Great Britain’s
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last-minute efforts to preserve the peace. That seems strange. You can
blame a murderer for his murder, but can you also blame him for not
making last-minute efforts to save his victim’s life when he lay bleeding on
the ground? I can understand blaming the Central Powers for inaugurating
the process by which the peace came to be broken; but then I just cannot
understand also blaming them for not averting the catastrophe at the last
minute. And why does he think Russia and France are guilty only of attempted Breaking of the Peace? Ostensibly because it was Germany which
declared war on them while they were still getting ready to declare war on
Germany. He does think they acted wrongly; it is evident that if they had
not acted as they did, Germany would not have declared war on them. So
why not blame them for the actual, as opposed to merely the attempted,
version of the crime? Nevertheless, whatever disagreements one might have
with him on minor points of criminal law doctrine, they do not affect the
bottom-line conclusion he reaches. This was not a conflict in which good
and blameless men came to blows.
If one wants to reach a fundamentally different conclusion from Kantorowicz’s, one has to start by scuttling a crucial premise on which his
analysis is built: that Serbia gave Austria no reason for some kind of retaliatory action. One has to believe that the assassination was somehow connected to the Serbian government, enough so as to call for some
anti-Serbian measure by Austria. That is in fact how many have viewed the
situation, and it is how I am going to view it from hereon. Because if one
does, the issue becomes rather more interesting: The conflict then really
does start to look like a form of gladiatorial combat, a conflict in which
several of the wrestling parties on both sides are in the right, a bizarre case
of permissible mutual frustration. At first blush, it might seem as though
nothing of the sort would happen. It might seem that if we say that Austria
was right to go against Serbia, then Germany was right to support Austria
in this, then Russia was wrong to oppose them in this, then France was
wrong to support Russia in its opposition, and England and Belgium were
wrong to support France and Russia. That at least is what a firm believer in
the correspondence thesis would be inclined to think. On closer inspection,
however, some paradoxical features of the situation start to emerge that
make the whole thing look much more like a case of permissible mutual
frustration. Let me examine each of these features in turn.

A. The Preemption Problem
Consider again the case of a wife who knows that if her husband should
learn of a certain fact—an infidelity, say—he is going to kill her. I suggested
that she would be entitled to start shooting at her husband in preemptive
self-defense even before he has learned the information that is going to
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induce him to attack her, and that he in turn, as yet technically innocent,
would be entitled to defend himself against her.
The opening constellation of World War I somewhat resembled this
scenario. On one account of the matter, Russia was well prepared to concede that Austria’s plans for Serbia were well justified and proportionate to
the offense perpetrated upon them. What they feared, however, was that
Austria’s plans would expand with its opportunities. Once an Austrian army
had occupied Serbia, it might well decide to dismember Serbia altogether,
parceling pieces out to the other Balkan states. This was apt to be followed
by a more general alliance between Austria and the remaining Balkan
states, an alliance which was likely to make increasingly aggressive moves on
Russia. These were not flimsy possibilities; the threat was genuine, but only
as a statistical matter. As a matter of actual intent, it was not part of Austria’s
planning. That put Russia in the position of the prescient wife, using deadly
force against the as-yet-technically-innocent husband (Austria), whose innocence entitles him to use deadly force on his attacker in turn.
At this point you may be ready to take issue with my original analysis of
the husband-and-wife hypothetical. If allowing both the wife and the husband to fire at each other with impunity leads to having to approve of the
actions of both sides in a war, maybe the analysis is not really that persuasive.
But my guess is that as you start to rethink the husband-and-wife hypothetical, the main thing that will lead you to doubt my conclusions about it is
that you still cannot let go of the correspondence thesis. The intuitive
appeal of the thesis makes it very hard to accept that A can be justified in
trying to kill B and B can be equally justified in trying to kill A. But despite
its intuitive appeal, the thesis is wrong. Deontological morality, I tried to
argue in the last section, is full of “moral combat.”

B. The Threat Problem
I noted earlier that it is often moral to threaten what you are not in fact
entitled to do. (If someone is about to steal my wallet, I cannot shoot him
to prevent his theft, but it would seem that I can threaten to shoot him.) I
then suggested that if the person who is thus threatened (the thief) proceeds to do the thing which the threatener (the owner) tries to deter him
from doing (namely, steal), then he might well be entitled to defend
himself with deadly force. But the threatener might then well be entitled to
reciprocate with the use of deadly force himself.
How does this map on to World War I? Russia arguably was bluffing, or
at least uncertain, hoping to keep Austria’s ambitions with respect to Serbia
in check but not necessarily meaning to meddle. Even if the threatened
intervention would have been wrongful, the threat of such an intervention
is a different story. As far as Germany and Austria were concerned, however,
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this was no bluff. And they acted accordingly, as much within their rights as
Russia.
Once again, you will be tempted to try to tinker with the moral principles
that give rise to this conflict. But your chief motivation, acknowledged or
not, will be your belief in the correspondence thesis. Without it, you should
be ready to accept that this is one of many instances of morally permissible
mutual frustration.
C. The Necessity Problem
Finally, let us revisit the case of the stranded hiker who tries to help himself
to some food out of my cabin, and whose efforts I in turn try to hinder. This
too, I claimed, is a case of permissible mutual frustration.
This case arguably maps onto the situation of Belgium at the outset of the
war. Germany arguably was right to attack France once an attack from
Russia was seemingly afoot and France had refused to disassociate itself
from Russia. A successful war on both Russia and France required implementation of the Schlieffen Plan, which required marching through Belgium first to defeat France and then redeploying the German army to fight
Russia. If Germany was in the right against Russia and France, marching
through Belgium was rendered permissible by necessity. But since Belgium
was in effect being asked to play the role of a Good Samaritan in volunteering its territory in support of Germany’s defense, it could certainly refuse.
And its friends—that is, Great Britain—could aid it in that refusal. To
paraphrase Bismarck’s dictum about the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, it
may be that Belgium and England were no more wrong in resisting Germany’s claim than Germany was in making them.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are numerous appealing moral arguments that can be made in
behalf of each of the warring parties of the Great War. One is tempted to
think that not all of those arguments can be right if they end up exonerating both sides to the conflict. But that temptation is rooted in a false
intuition, the correspondence thesis—the idea that there can be no such
thing as “moral combat.” In the world of our everyday morality at least, such
conflicts are a commonplace occurrence.
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